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RELEASE  
DATE: 03-04-2016~~SECRET//NC/CIA-IUO/ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

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**(S//NC/CIA-IUO/OC/NF) SUBJ: INITIAL REACTION OF OFFICERS OF FOURTH BRIGADE  
 TO IDEA OF CEASE FIRE WITH THE INSURGENTS**

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3) NatSecAct

30 November 1984

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Doc Number: [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

~~(S//NC/CIA-IUO/OC/NF) DIST: 30 NOVEMBER 1984~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: INITIAL REACTION OF OFFICERS OF FOURTH BRIGADE TO IDEA OF  
 CEASE FIRE WITH THE INSURGENTS

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[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 BRIGADE COMMANDER LT. COL. SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ CALLED A MEETING  
 OF FOURTH BRIGADE OFFICERS ON THE EVENING OF 15 NOVEMBER 1984. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AT A COMMANDERS MEETING EARLIER  
 THAT DAY AT HIGH COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN SAN SALVADOR, THERE HAD BEEN  
 A DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE CEASE FIRE BETWEEN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY  
 AND THE INSURGENTS. [REDACTED]

ALL BUT  
 THREE OF THE COMMANDERS WERE OPPOSED TO A CEASE FIRE, AND THAT ONLY  
 THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY  
 HOSPITAL, AND THE CHIEF OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS WERE FOR IT.

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2. [REDACTED] OCHOA ASKED HIS OFFICERS' OPINIONS  
 ON THE SUBJECT OF A CEASE FIRE. [REDACTED] ALL WERE AGREED THAT

A CEASE FIRE WOULD NOT BE GOOD BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN AN INCREASE,  
 RATHER THAN A DECREASE, IN INSURGENT VIOLENCE SINCE THE 15 OCTOBER  
 TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INSURGENTS; THE PEOPLE HAVE  
 BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE TALKS BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED  
 VIOLENCE; A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS

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DEVELOPED AMONG MANY MILITARY OFFICERS BECAUSE HE HAS NEVER MADE  
A FULL REPORT TO THE MILITARY ON THE 15 OCTOBER DISCUSSIONS; AND  
A CEASE FIRE WOULD ONLY HELP THE INSURGENTS TO REST AND PREPARE FOR  
ANOTHER OFFENSIVE. [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE OFFICERS OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE DID  
NOT CONSIDER A COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR  
AGREE TO A CEASE FIRE. FOR THEM, A CEASE FIRE IS UNTHINKABLE, AND  
THUS IN THEIR VIEW IT WILL NOT COME ABOUT.)

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[REDACTED] ALL  
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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